One would expect the Central Intelligence Agency to think alot about thinking. After all, they have agents and analysts spread about the globe…drawing on whatever data, experience, and context they can to form actionable plans for complex issues. So, while other organizations might measure and assess the effectiveness of their construction process or supply chain, the CIA is likely in the business of doing the same with the distributed network of knowledge-builders that make up what they do.
Of course, that same CIA has been attacked of late for a few tiny errors in their analyses — or the faulty interpretation by others of their analyses (don’t worry, this isn’t a political blog). But we can still benefit from the thinking they do about thinking, even if they don’t actually read the reports themselves.
One such treatise is the Psychology of Intelligence Analysis by Richards J. Heuer, Jr., available in full text on the CIA’s web site. It’s a kind of training textbook for CIA operatives to understand their ‘mental machinery,’ explore various tools for thinking more clearly and effectively, identify the various cognitive biases (bad wiring) that leads us to false conclusions, and form a plan for continually improving (or avoiding) the above.
Heuer’s central ideas in the work, summarized in the introduction, make it clear how adaptable this information is to any endeavor…including the data-gathering and decision-making elements of arts and cultural management:
- The mind is poorly ”wired” to deal effectively with both inherent uncertainty (the natural fog surrounding complex, indeterminate intelligence issues) and induced uncertainty (the man-made fog fabricated by denial and deception operations).
- Even increased awareness of cognitive and other “unmotivated” biases, such as the tendency to see information confirming an already-held judgment more vividly than one sees ”disconfirming” information, does little by itself to help analysts deal effectively with uncertainty.
- Tools and techniques that gear the analyst’s mind to apply higher levels of critical thinking can substantially improve analysis on complex issues on which information is incomplete, ambiguous, and often deliberately distorted. Key examples of such intellectual devices include techniques for structuring information, challenging assumptions, and exploring alternative interpretations.
Of course, instead of using our analysis to topple regimes, siphon money to international splinter groups, and assess security threats, the arts manager might focus more on donor thank-you letters, marketing evaluation, and whether to serve rubber chicken or dry fish at the upcoming gala. But it’s kind of the same thing.
My thanks to friend and colleague Andrew Blau for the link.
