ROTHKOPF: WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW

Your messages must have done the trick. C-SPAN has posted the video of the David Rothkopf interview. Go there and click "Watch." It runs for an hour.

The first 15 minutes is background that will familiarize you with the players of the past. As Rothkopf gets closer to the present his observations cut closer to the bone. For those who have followed the issues, his observations may not be new. But he clarifies what's been happening and wraps it up nicely. Most impressive, Rothkopf, who is the author of "Running the World," does it with the authority of someone who has studied the events closely, talked to the players, knows the ways of the government based on his own insider experience, and speaks in a tone of impartiality. Yes, he has his own opinions. But so do we all, and he expresses his with extreme civility.

Here's a partial rush transcript, in case you can't watch the video. My staff of thousands typed it up so you could read it in advance of the president's speech tonight.

WHO MADE THE DECISIONS DURING 9/11?

The president's first response was to turn to the vice president, who had a lot of experience [and] was playing senior stateman. The vice president in turn had a longstanding relationship with his former boss, Donald Rumsfeld. So the two of them formed an operating unit that had disproportionate influence within the counsels of the president. Meanwhile the president is learning how to be president. The professor who is teaching him this is Condoleeza Rice [National Security Advisor at the time]. The core choice for the National Security Advisor is either staff the president or run the institution [the National Security Council]. Optimally you try to do both. but she was drawn into staffing the president, so she couldnt really be the honest broker. Colin Powell was left as odd man out [pursuing traditional policies. Consequently] the balance of power stayed in the Rumsfeld-Cheney axis. Of course many of the neocons worked for for one or the other of the two of them.

WHAT ABOUT DICK CHENEY?

Dick Cheney had undergone a kind of change. Many people had throughout his career seen him as the consummate, pragmatic, thoughtful professional. Many said to me they watched him become much more ideological in the wake of 9/11. This was a surprise to them and [was] another reason the balance shifted away from the traditionalists. I think the Bush administration made a very serious mistake when it started turning away dissenting voices from within. It's one thing to say we will discount the Democrats, because they're partisan. Very often the Democracts are partisan. But the way this system works best is when the president is presented with choices. [For instance] Nixon said I want to be given choices. I don't want you making the decisions for me. ... This president [GWB], by placing a premium on loyalty and consensus, robs himself of hearing alternative views. And as we've seen -- in terms of troop strength in Iraq, post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq, the rationale for going in, the WMDF, the interpretation of intelligence, and some of the reconstruction of the [U.S.] government's national security apparatus -- he would have been better served by listening more closely to alternative views.

WHY POINT THE FINGER AT RICE?

[Rice] has to assume a lot of the responsibility [for pushing the agenda that pointed to the existence of WMD]. The National Security Advisor and National Security Concil staff are the ones putting words in the president's mouth. It's their job to determine whether the words are correct, whether they'll have repercussions. ... Ultimately Steve Hadley [who worked for Rice] took the rap for this misstep and was rewarded by getting the National Security Advisor job afterwards. So it looks to me that he was publicly taking the rap to avoid somebody above him taking the rap. [The people above] deserve the responsibility. ... At the end of the day, the person who's responsible for the way the National Security Council operates is the president of the United States. If he sends a message about the kind of processes and kind of rigor that he wants [and] then that doesn't serve him, he's really the guy who's responsible.

IS CHENEY A NEOCON?

At his core he's very conservative. ... Some trends are discernible. ... According to people involved in the deliberations during the first Gulf War, he was one of the more reluctant about going to the United Nations, working through them, building up a big coaltion [and] fund-raising [to pay for the war]. He's been resistant to this kind of process. ... That, more than the neocon philosophy, has informed his views toward the United Nations, the nature of the alliances that we've built up, or towards our treament of some of our allies. Other people -- the Wolfowitzes and some others -- are neocons in the true sense of the word.

IS RUMSFELD A NEOCON?

Rumsfeld is neither a neocon nor just a conservative. [He's] a Rumsfeldian and seeks to advance his own self-interests as he defines them and in so doing has become a powerful force in alliance [with Cheney]. In the book I quote Kissinger as saying, "I found Rumsfeld to be the most ruthless person I ever met." That's saying something.

IS CHENEY THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND BUSH?

The partnership is constantly evolving. I don't think anybody should make the mistake of underestimating George Bush. Bill Clinton repeats this contantly to Democrats, who often don't listen. ... I think in the early years of the administration, Bush was clearly not experienced in foreign policy, nor was he an experienced president. He had at his side somebody who had been Secretary of Defense, a leading member of congress, chief of staff of an important administration. His father trusted [Cheney], and Cheney is someone with strong opinions. ... He was the 800-pound gorilla. ... By the admission of people very, very close to this administration, Cheney was the most powerful vice president in U.S. history. Cheney is still critically important and a real driving force. But he's not what he was.

WHAT ABOUT CHENEY'S BLUNDERS?

Rumsfeld deserves at least as much credit as Cheney for the blunders that were made. ... I think they were planning to go into Iraq long before they got [to Washington]. ... Dealing with Saddam Hussein was on the agenda long before 9/11. ... What they were doing prior to going to war essentially was rationale shopping. One day it would be WMD, the next day it would be democracy. The next day it would be fighting terrorism. What[ever] works. ... I spoke to European leaders at the time who said the only reason we're going to support this [war in Iraq] is WMD. So it was like, if that's going to work, we'll make it work.

WHAT WAS THE BIGGEST MISTAKE?

Apart from that decision, the seminal mistake so far has been not sending enough troops. It's not like the information wasn't there. It's not like they didn't know this. It's not like the intelligence wasn't saying we needed more [troops]. It's not like precedent didn't say this, not like the Army chief of staff, Gen. Schinseki, wasn't saying we needed more, or the State Department wasn't laying out a plan for what was needed for reconstruction. Rumsfeld arrogantly, essentially, said: "No we don't." ... Certainly going in under strength represents a deliberate decision to unlearn many the lessons of the recent past. And that decision lies heavily on the doorstep of Rumsfeld with the collaboration of Cheney.

Rumsfeld and Cheney and all the rest and a lot of the neocons in and out were arguing this was going to be a very easy war, a cakewalk; the Iraqis would come out and welcome us out with flags; it would be like Paris after World War II. That completely was wrong. These people [in the administration] spent most of their careers in office jobs, think tanks. None of them served in the military. A number of them disdained the military. ... They didn't listen to people with the military experience. The U.S. military at the leadership level has some of the most remarkable people in Washington, the most experienced and intelligent people. They were deliberately being turned off.

MILITARY DOCTRINE VIOLATED, PRINCIPLES UNDERMINED

But it goes beyond that. I think they overreacted to 9/11 in some fundamental ways. This led to a decision to violate not just military doctrine but principles that are core principles that have led to American strength in the world. When Guantanamo [prison] was set up, I have a friend who was down there who got a memo from the Department of Defense, signed by the Secretary of Defense, saying you have more latitude than you traditionally would have had while you are interrogating these prisoners. Abu Ghraib is another example of that. Compromising America's moral authority, just like compromising our economic strength, reveals a deep misreading of the nature of National Security Policy. [It's] not just about identifying threats and responding to them. It's about identifying sources of our strength and cultivating them, and then using the sources of our strength in order to help us protect against threats. That's how we won the Cold War, not [by] containment. ... George Kennan, writing in the "long telegram" in 1947, said if we are to defeat the Soviets it will be by cultivating the economy, [cultivating] a strong society, because that will enable us to do what we want to do and will draw people to us. These guys, in their desire to make a mark, to react, essentially undermined two pillars of our strength -- our economic strength and our moral authority.

A lot of chickens are going to come home to roost in the next few months -- whether it's the Iraq referendum, or the progress of insurgency against the United States, or the elections in the Palestinian territory, whether Hamas actually wins those elections, and also I might add, how the U.S. economy fares when we seem not to care about building up deficits and spending money on the war, despite the fact that borrowing that money from the few countries in Asia willing to lend us that money, puts us in a very, very precarious position right down to Main Street.

DEBATE QUASHED WHEN NEEDED MOST

I think we have made as many mistakes of commission as we have of omission. In the wake of 9/11 what happened in this country was that if you were to oppose this action you were equated with becoming traitors, that you were not patriotic, you were not supporting the United States. Debate was quashed at just the moment when we neeeded the most debate. Now I personally think there are plenty of reasons to go into Iraq. [But] I think the time was not right. I think the rationale was not right. I think the method was not right.

WASN'T IRAQ A BAD PLACE?

Certainly Iraq was a bad place and Saddam Hussein was a bad guy. I think there are plenty of reasons for us to intervene even unilaterally when we see a dramatic threat to the United States, an imminent threat, and that's been U.S. policy for a long time.

SO WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?

What I see as the principle problem here was stepping away from the ideals that were framed in the earliest days of the Republic and reinforced after the Second World War, which is that whatever power is accrued by individuals or states needs to be submitted to a system of law. Because that's what we essentially are about. George Washington could have been king. He chose not to be. He said that's not why we fought. I submt myself to the system of law. No man is above the law. I submit myself to the system. At the end of World War II, we said we will create a global system that we will participate in because we realize what happens when nation-states act alone in their narrow national interest. And these principles were completely abrogated in the wake of 9/11 because we assessed the threat as being so great that working within system, building communities, building up systems of law, were no longer in our interest. And I think that played into the hands of the terrorists. I think it weakened us, and I think that is the essential change that needs to take place over the course of the years to come. We need to again convince the world -- and believe in our own hearts -- that it's in our interest to have a system of law where our interests are protected, but so are everyone else's.