![](\"http:\/\/www.artsjournal.com\/herman\/images\/carlconettaPHOTO.jpg\")
<\/A>Carl Conetta lays it out in \nof Occupation and Resistance in Iraq, Part One, Patterns of Popular Discontent” for the Project
\non Defense Alternatives. In clear language, the academic sound of the title notwithstanding,
\nConetta offers the strongest, most detailed and comprehrensive, fully documented understanding
\nof the situation that I’ve come across.<\/P>
\n
His analysis is large as well as granular. It is replete with both historical perspective and
\npolling data. It describes patterns of coalition military activity such as house raids and street
\npatrols, their impact on the Iraqi population, their efficacy in quelling the insurgency. It begins by
\npointing out, not surprisingly, that “the occupation of Iraq is today less about rolling back Iraqi
\nmilitary power, dislodging a tyrant, or building a stable democracy than it is about fighting an
\ninsurgency — an insurgency that is now driven substantially by the occupation, its practices, and
\npolicies.” The vicious circle consists of this: “[A]ctions to curtail the insurgency feed the
\ninsurgency.”<\/P>
\n
Conetta, above, the co-director of the project, explains why the U.S. regime’s do-good [a]lthough the power of nationalistic feelings is universally recognized, occupiers often resist <\/P> Even Napoleon Bonaparte expected during his 1799 campaign in Egypt and Syria that his The section on “house raids” and “street patrols” specifies what has gone wrong with the <\/P> Most of the house raids turn up nothing — 70 percent according to one officer — and most of In some cases, the scope of the raids has been made intentionally broad so as to affect the Productive or not, the raids are traumatic events, often mentioned as a motivating factor by [S]warmed through the compound, corralling the women and children into one room and <\/P> But as the soldiers began questioning the blindfolded Iraqis they realized they were in the Along similar lines, Bill Johnson, an embedded reporter for the RockyMountain News, The force of the two pounds of C-4 explosive … collapses the double aluminum doors <\/P> These third-party eyewitness accounts accord with many of the stories told by Iraqis. Ken At least three dozen American soldiers blazed away for more than 60 minutes in the early <\/P> Peter Beaumont of the UK Observer offers this report of a 6 September 2003 raid on an Whatever happened here was one-sided, a wall of fire unleashed at a building packed with <\/P> The raids seem to exhibit a general pattern which was summarized in a February 2004 report Arresting authorities entered houses usually after dark, breaking down doors, waking up <\/P> US units often render some payment to families for collateral damage. It is also common to <\/P> As a Straight Up regular says, “the Americans are quite literally behaving like Nazis.” Sadly, Carl Conetta lays it out in “Vicious Circle,” his research monograph on “The Dynamics of Occupation and Resistance in Iraq, Part One, Patterns of Popular Discontent” for the Project on Defense Alternatives. In clear language, the academic sound of the title notwithstanding, Conetta offers the strongest, most detailed and comprehrensive, fully documented understanding of the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_genesis_hide_title":false,"_genesis_hide_breadcrumbs":false,"_genesis_hide_singular_image":false,"_genesis_hide_footer_widgets":false,"_genesis_custom_body_class":"","_genesis_custom_post_class":"","_genesis_layout":"","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-1140","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-main","7":"entry"},"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/pbvgEs-io","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.artsjournal.com\/herman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1140","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.artsjournal.com\/herman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.artsjournal.com\/herman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.artsjournal.com\/herman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.artsjournal.com\/herman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1140"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.artsjournal.com\/herman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1140\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.artsjournal.com\/herman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1140"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.artsjournal.com\/herman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1140"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.artsjournal.com\/herman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1140"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\n![](\"http:\/\/www.artsjournal.com\/herman\/images\/PDAphoto.gif\")
<\/A><\/P>
\n
\npronouncements on Iraqi freedom and liberation — which Americans seem to have accepted as
\ntrue, despite their own growing skepticism about the war — have far less impact in the war theater
\nthan was foolishly expected by the neocon instigators of the invasion. “Public discontent is the
\nwater in which the insurgents swim,” he writes. “Polls show that a large majority of Iraqis have
\nlittle faith in coalition troops and view them as occupiers, not liberators.” Historically, <\/P>
\n
\n
\nthe conclusion that their behavior is implicated by these feelings — especially if the ostensible
\ngoals of occupation are humanitarian or paternalistic. <\/P>
\n
\n
\narmy would “increase with the discontented” and “armed masses” of the region because, in accord
\nwith the principles of the French revolution, he sought “the abolition of slavery and of the
\ntyrannical government of the pashas”. As it turned out, the oppressed masses did not flock to
\nNapoleon’s standard. Eight years later he was similarly disappointed in Spain. He entered the
\ncountry proclaiming that “With my banner bearing the words ‘Liberty and Emancipation from
\nSuperstition, I shall be regarded as the liberator of Spain.” Instead, the Spanish resistance tied
\ndown hundreds of thousands of French troops for 5 years, sapping the empire and exposing it to
\neasy attack by the British. (Not incidentally, the Spanish war popularized the term guerilla or
\n“small war” among the British.) It mattered not one wit that the French political and economic
\nsystem were in many ways preferable to both that of the Ottomans and that of the Spanish. What
\ndecided the popular response to Napoleon was his means of engagement: war, conquest, and
\noccupation.<\/P><\/BLOCKQUOTE>
\n
\noccupation. And all of it, ironically, has been published in the mainstream American or British
\npress, albeit not as widely publicized as it should have been. Here, for example, is Conetta
\non<\/P>
\n
\nHouse raids<\/FONT><\/B><\/A>
\n
\n
\nthose detained are soon released. Division and brigade units may hold as many as 1,300 detainees
\nat any one time, releasing between 66 percent and 75 percent within a few days. Others are sent
\nto one of several prisons in Iraq controlled by the United States, which hold approximately 9,000
\nprisoners. Many of these central detainees are also released after six months. The International
\nCommittee of the Red Cross reports being told by military intelligence officers that between 70
\npercent and 90 percent of these were being held by mistake — an estimate affirmed independently
\nby some who have worked in the system.<\/P>
\n
\nwider family, friendship networks, and neighborhoods of suspected insurgents and other wanted
\nindividuals. In other cases, entire villages have been sealed off so that residents must enter or
\nleave only through control points. (Some of these practices were already underway during the
\nsecond-half of 2003 — long before the insurgency reached its peak levels and long before the
\ndevastating fall 2004 attack on Falluja.)<\/P>
\n
\nthose who oppose the US occupation. Anthony Loyd of the London Times reports on several
\nraids conducted in December 2004 in Zangora, a small town near Ramadi. The American troops,
\nafter using a shotgun to blast open the door of the target residence,<\/P>
\n
\nthe men — by then cuffed and blindfolded — into another as the search for munitions and
\ndocuments began. Household goods were sent clattering to the floor, mattresses and bedding
\nupturned, the contents of cupboards and drawers spilt on to a growing pile of personal effects and
\ndomestic items.<\/I><\/P>
\n
\n
\nwrong house. The next target of the night’s raids was also mistaken.<\/P>
\n
\nrecounts one of a series of raids that took place in Samarra in December 2003:<\/P>
\n
\nleading into the courtyard of a house…. An elderly man and two others are left standing exposed
\nin the courtyard. They fall face-first to the ground as a half-dozen M-16s are swung their way.
\nOnly their mouths move as they plead in Arabic for the soldiers not to shoot. … The men of 2nd
\nPlatoon race past the burning car, kick open the door of the house and rush inside. Three men lay
\nface down in the front room, adorned only with rugs and pillows. Against a wall, three women
\nand three young children sob uncontrollably. … [T]he house is thoroughly searched for weapons.
\nNone are found. The men are bound with plastic handcuffs and led to a Bradley. … Prisoners
\ntaken earlier have identified the three as major weapons dealers in the city. … They face days of
\ncustody and rigorous interrogation. Lt. Dave Nelson has spent the last few minutes distributing
\nmoney that command has given him to compensate neighbors whose homes have been damaged
\nby the blasts. The raids have netted more than a half-dozen men, but few weapons. “That ain’t the
\npoint,” a burly sergeant … says, as we speed away. “We’re showing the bad guys we’re here, we
\nain’t playing and we damn sure ain’t going away.”<\/I><\/P>
\n
\n
\nDilanian and Drew Brown, reporters for the Knight Ridder news service, recount the experience
\nof Dr. Talib Abdul Jabar Al Sayeed, whose Baghdad home was raided on 31 July 2003:<\/P>
\n
\nmorning hours of July 31, the British-trained physician recounted recently, pointing to the
\nhundreds of bullet holes that still mark his stately home. “I shouted at them with all my strength to
\nstop shooting,” said Al Sayeed, 62. “I will open the door. Please give me a chance.” Eventually,
\nAl Sayeed said, the commanding officer told him he was sorry: They had raided the wrong house.
\nBut not before a soldier burst in and struck Al Sayeed with a rifle butt, knocking him down. The
\nsoldier kicked him in the ribs – an X-ray later showed they were cracked – and others bound his
\nhands with plastic cuffs as his wife and young nieces cowered in the next room. They also took
\nhis three grown sons in for questioning, and they remain in a military jail in the south of
\nIraq.<\/I><\/P>
\n
\n
\napartment complex in Mahmudiya, near Baghdad, during which 18-year-old Farah Fadhil was
\nkilled by a hand grenade:<\/P>
\n
\nsleeping families. Further examination shows powder burns where door locks had been shot off
\nand splintered wood where the doors had been kicked in. All the evidence was that this was a raid
\nthat…went horribly wrong. This is what the residents and local police told us had happened:
\nInside the apartment with Farah were her mother and a brother, Haroon, 13. As the soldiers
\nstarted smashing doors, they began to kick in Farah’s door with no warning. Panicking, and
\nthinking that thieves were breaking into the apartment, Haroon grabbed a gun owned by his father
\nand fired some shots to scare them off. The soldiers outside responded by shooting up the
\nbuilding and throwing grenades into Farah’s apartment.<\/I><\/P>
\n
\n
\nby the International Committee of the Red Cross, based on its own investigation of reported
\nincidents:<\/P>
\n
\nresidents roughly, yelling orders, forcing family members into one room under military guard
\nwhile searching the rest of the house and further breaking doors, cabinets, and other property.
\nThey arrested suspects, tying their hands in the back with flexicuffs, hooding them, and taking
\nthem away. Sometimes they arrested all adult males in the house, including elderly, handicapped,
\nor sick people. Treatment often included pushing people around, insulting, taking aim with rifles,
\npunching and kicking, and striking with rifles. Individuals were often led away in whatever they
\nhappened to be wearing at the time of arrest — sometimes pyjamas or underwear… In many cases
\npersonal belongings were seized during the arrest with no receipt given…. In almost all incidents
\ndocumented by the ICRC, arresting authorities provided no information about who they were,
\nwhere their base was located, nor did they explain the cause of arrest. Similarly, they rarely
\ninformed the arrestee or his family where he was being taken or for how long, resulting in the
\ndefacto disappearance of the arrestee for weeks or even months until contact was finally
\nmade.<\/I><\/P>
\n
\n
\nconfiscate “excessive” family money, gold, or other valuables, however — even in those cases
\nwhere neither suspects nor banned types or quantities of weapons are found. This, on the theory
\nthat the information targeting a family may be at least partially correct and that the family may be
\nfinancing insurgent activities. Of course, it is hard to ascertain what constitutes “excessive”
\nhousehold valuables in a country with a cash economy but no functioning banking system.
\nThroughout the period of sanctions, war, and occupation, it has been common for Iraqis to invest
\nin gold jewelry as a form of inflation-proof savings. At any rate, the confiscations have generated
\nhundreds of tort claims and add to the Iraqis’ sense that the occupying troops are behaving in
\nindefensible ways.<\/P><\/BLOCKQUOTE>
\n
\n
\nhe’s right. Is there any other way to put it? Meantime, the leaders of the U.S. regime have not
\nbeen held accountable. Cheney Boy has the unmitigated gall to say he’s
\noffended<\/FONT><\/B><\/A> by Amnesty International’s comparison of the detention center at
\nGuantanamo to a gulag-style camp, while Dear Leader calls Amnesty’s allegations “absurd.”<\/FONT><\/B><\/A> What’s absurd is
\nthat anyone would believe him.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"